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Comment
CORRECTING CORRECTIONS: DISCREPANCIES IN DEFINING
STATE MANSLAUGHTER AS A “CRIME OF VIOLENCE”
FOR FEDERAL SENTENCING PURPOSES
MEAGHAN GEATENS*
“Welcome to the counter-intuitive world of sentencing . . . .”1
I. THE INITIAL CHARGES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PREDICATE VIOLENT
CRIME CLASSIFICATION
Initially, George Gordon was charged with statutory rape.2  Gordon,
who was an adult at the time of his conviction, had engaged in sexual
intercourse with a child younger than 17-years-old.3  But on October 8,
2004, Gordon pled guilty to one count of endangering the welfare of a
child in the first degree under Missouri law, instead of the rape that he
had initially been charged with.4  The new charge for endangering the
welfare of a child originated from the same set of facts that could have
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2017, Drexel University.  This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Fran and
Marianne Geatens, my siblings, Jenny, Brian, and Katie, as well as my late
grandmother Bertha Spahn and our Kona.  I am incredibly grateful for your
support and love every single day, and thank you endlessly for all you do for me.  I
would also like to thank the members of the Villanova Law Review for their
assistance in helping me make this Comment all that it has become.
1. Douglas J. Bench, Jr., What Constitutes A Violent Felony After Begay?, 67 J. MO.
B. 208 (2011) (explaining difficulties in determining what qualifies as a violent
crime in federal court for the purposes of federal sentencing).  In addition, Bench
notes that the applications of the categorical and modified categorical approaches
in classifying predicate crimes as crimes of violence can result in decisions that may
appear “absurd” when considering the underlying facts of particular predicate
crimes. See id. at 214.
2. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at *i, United States v.
Gordon, 557 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that Gordon was originally charged
with statutory rape, but the charge was later amended to endangering the welfare
of a child).
3. See id. at *6 (stating the facts that Gordon “knowingly acted in a manner
that created a substantial risk to the body and health of B.S. . . . a child less than 17
years old, by engaging in sexual intercourse with B.S.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
4. See United States v. Gordon, 557 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining
that Gordon alleged in his plea and acknowledged that he “knowingly act[ed] in a
manner that created a substantial risk to the body and health . . . of a child of less
than seventeen years old”) (internal quotations omitted).
(309)
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convicted him of statutory rape—his sexual relationship with a minor.5
Ultimately, in pleading guilty to child endangerment, Gordon pled to
“knowingly . . . act[ing] so as to create a substantial risk to the life, body, or
health of a child under seventeen.”6
Gordon was charged with another crime in 2006.7  When Gordon was
sentenced in connection with his 2006 conviction, the court held that his
previous conviction for endangering the welfare of a child (while origi-
nally charged as rape) was not a “crime of violence” for the purposes of
applying a sentencing enhancement.8  Intuitively, it may come as a sur-
prise that raping a minor was not considered a crime of violence in assess-
ing a defendant’s predicate violent crimes and criminal history.9
The shocking concept that raping a minor is not a crime of violence is
not the only important part of Gordon’s story.10  The classification of his
prior crime had a significant impact on the sentence imposed in Gordon’s
subsequent legal proceedings; if his previous conviction was a crime of
violence, Gordon would be subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum
5. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *i, United States v.
Gordon, 557 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the same factual circumstances
that initially constituted the statutory rape charge also gave rise to a charge for
endangering the welfare of a child).
6. See Gordon, 557 F.3d at 626 (giving statutory definition of Gordon’s
conviction).
7. See id. at 624 (noting facts of Gordon’s current charge).
8. See id. at 627–28 (holding that conviction under MO. REV. STAT. 568.045(1)
did not constitute a crime of violence because, in comparing the Missouri statute
to burglary, arson, or other offenses under the Armed Criminal Career Act,
Gordon’s prior conviction did not suggest the same level of “violent or aggressive
conduct”); see also id. at 625 n.3 (citing United States v. Williams, 537 F.2d 969, 972
n.1 (8th Cir. 2008)) (noting that while statutory rape does constitute a violent
felony and sexual intercourse with a child would also constitute a violent crime,
circuit precedent requires that the sentencing court “should consider how the law
defines the crime, not how a crime might be committed on a particular occasion”).
In further explaining its decision, the court noted that the analysis of the predicate
crime needs to be confined to the statute itself, instead of the factual circum-
stances of the crime. See id.
9. See Bench, supra note 1, at 208 (observing that a fact pattern that consti-
tuted rape did not amount to classification as a crime of violence in Gordon, and
noting the strange discrepancies in outcome where classifications of crimes of vio-
lence are considered).  Bench also notes that while this crime, which was the
equivalent of statutory rape, did not qualify as a crime of violence for the purposes
of federal sentencing in conjunction with the Armed Career Criminal Act, other
seemingly less “violent” crimes, such as possession of a sawed-off shotgun or refus-
ing to pull over for the police, did qualify as a crime of violence for the purposes of
sentencing guidelines. See id.  Bench emphasizes that these classifications seem
“counter-intuitive.” See id.
10. See Gordon, 557 F.3d at 623 (analyzing whether the endangering the wel-
fare of a child charge was a predicate violent felony as a first step in determining
whether the Armed Career Criminal Act’s sentencing enhancement for three prior
violent felonies would apply).  For a full discussion of the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA) and the sentencing enhancement, see infra notes 42–50 and accompa-
nying text.
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under the Armed Career Criminal Act.11  On the other hand, if, as the
court ultimately decided, his predicate crime was not a crime of violence,
the mandatory minimum would be taken off the table.12
With the term—crime of violence—playing a large role in federal sen-
tencing proceedings, scholars have largely debated its definition over the
years.13  Certain Federal Sentencing Guidelines and their accompanying
federal statutory schemes mandate that if a defendant has previously com-
mitted one or several other crime(s) of violence, the individual will auto-
matically face a significant mandatory minimum for the sentence at
hand.14  In some cases, these mandatory minimums have the consequence
11. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *8, United States v.
Gordon, 557 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that in his present criminal sta-
tus, Gordon had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and
this hearing was centered on deciding whether the endangering of the welfare of a
child conviction qualified as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes).  Under
the ACCA, if a person has committed three previous violent felonies, they are sub-
ject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum under federal sentencing guidelines. See
id. at *6.  For a full discussion of the ACCA and the sentencing enhancement im-
posed under the act in connection with prior violent felony convictions, see infra
notes 42–50 and accompanying text.
12. See Gordon, 557 F.3d at 623 (holding that because “Gordon’s 2004 Mis-
souri conviction for endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree is not an
ACCA predicate offense,” Gordon’s sentence did not qualify for the Armed Career
Criminal Act fifteen-year enhancement).  Because the district court in Gordon held
that his child endangerment charge did qualify as a predicate violent crime, the
Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded Gordon’s case for a new sentencing hearing.
See id.
13. See, e.g., Jason A. Stegner, Circuit Court Division and the Supreme Court’s
Begay Decision: Is Eluding Police in a Vehicle a Violent Felony or Crime of Violence?, 10
APPALACHIAN J.L. 183, 184 (2011) (calling for clarity across jurisdictions classifying
the crime of eluding police in a vehicle as a crime of violence under the ACCA); see
Bench, supra note 1, at 208 (seeking clarity on what constitutes a violent felony
after United States v. Begay); Megan A. Embrey, A Circuit Split Survey on Violent
Felonies and Crimes of Violence: Where Does the Tenth Circuit Stand?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV.
469, 479–80 (2011) (observing splits on whether fleeing a police officer can be
classified as a crime of violence).
14. See James G. Levine, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 539 (2009) (dis-
cussing the ACCA and the potential for fifteen-year mandatory minimums under
the statute).  Levine particularly discusses mandatory minimums with respect to
felons carrying firearms under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)).  Levine calls for amendments to
the statute and proposes a number of changes in the timeline of predicate offenses
that qualify as violent felonies. See Levine, supra, at 551.  He further provides an
assertion that particular crimes that are not always classified as violent felonies
should be included as “crimes of violence” for sentencing purposes. See Levine,
supra, at 558.  Another critic’s analysis also notes the importance of the definition
of “crime of violence” for the purposes of the ACCA and Career Offender Provi-
sions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See Daniel O’Connor, Defining
the Strike Zone—an Analysis of the Classification of Prior Convictions Under the Federal
“Three-Strikes and You’re Out” Scheme, 36 B.C. L. REV.  847, 847 (1995) (commenting
on the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act’s three-strikes scheme,
which requires mandatory life sentences for defendants convicted of three violent
felonies).  Additionally, a separate critic notes that in the United States, on the
overall scale, “considerable weight” is given to predicate crime convictions in sen-
3
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of sentencing defendants to at least fifteen years of incarceration.15
Under other circumstances, for those who have committed three prior
crimes of violence, defendants may be sentenced to life in prison.16
In addition to differing statutory schemes, there are different types of
analyses that courts use to determine whether a predicate offense consti-
tutes a crime of violence: the categorical and the modified categorical ap-
proaches.17  For example, in United States v. Leaverton,18 the Tenth Circuit
held that a defendant’s Oklahoma manslaughter conviction did not con-
stitute a crime of violence after utilizing the modified categorical ap-
proach.19  Concluding otherwise and using the categorical approach, the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Smith20 held that a voluntary manslaugh-
ter conviction under North Carolina law does qualify as a crime of vio-
lence.21  These cases are representative of the divisiveness that surrounds
defining what constitutes a crime of violence.22
With a substantial amount of mandatory incarceration time weighing
in the balance, lives lie in the hands of the sentencing judge and whether
previous crimes committed qualify as crimes of violence.23  For this rea-
tencing hearings, and the “breadth of offenses in relation to which legislative en-
hancements apply is very wide; the enhancements are large in objective terms.” See
Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime-Not the Prior Convictions of the
Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous
Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 347, 354, 366 (2014) (arguing
that in many cases, prior convictions are a driving force and primary consideration
in imposing a sentence for the crime at hand).
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (mandating that if a defendant who has previ-
ously committed a “crime of violence” commits his current crime with a firearm,
he will be automatically subjected to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum for
sentencing).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2018) (directing that conviction of three violent
crimes subjects a defendant in his next crime to a mandatory life sentence).
17. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (explaining that, depend-
ing on which circumstances apply, courts can use the categorical approach or the
modified categorical approach to classify predicate violent felonies).
18. 895 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2018).
19. See id. at 1255–58 (applying modified categorical approach and divisibility
analysis and finding that Oklahoma Manslaughter I conviction does not qualify as
predicate violent felony).
20. 882 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2018).
21. See id. at 463–64 (applying categorical approach and holding that North
Carolina voluntary manslaughter conviction does qualify as predicate violent
felony).
22. See Bench, supra note 1, at 214 (noting that the term “violent” is much
more nuanced when used in terms of federal sentencing).
23. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Firearms
Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System 9 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/re-
search/research-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties-firearms-offenses-federal-
system [https://perma.cc/VW69-Y6Z6] (articulating the mandatory minimums as-
sociated with firearms offenses, including the Armed Career Criminal Act, which
imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum for defendants who have been con-
victed of three prior violent felonies or drug offenses); Congressional Research
Service, Three Strike Mandatory Sentencing (18 U.S.C. 3559(c)): An Overview (2010),
4
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son, how a crime of violence is defined for the purposes of sentencing
statutes must be taken seriously, be applied uniformly, and not be arbitrar-
ily based on the outcome of a divisibility analysis.24  A more uniform appli-
cation of what constitutes a crime of violence will ensure both consistent
sentences and justice, nationwide and within individual circuits.25
This Comment explores the recent decisions that discussed man-
slaughter convictions under several state statutes as crimes of violence for
the purposes of federal sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act
and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act’s three-strikes
provision.26  In response, this Comment calls for a parallel outcome with
respect to the classification of manslaughter as a crime of violence across
federal jurisdictions.27  What qualifies as a crime of violence should be
defined in a parallel manner across all jurisdictions—justice cannot be
fairly administered where a regime allows state-specific statutory analyses
to impose a mandatory fifteen-year or life sentence for a crime in one
federal court, while the same crime is punished less severely in another
federal court merely because of varying definitions.28  Part II of this Com-
ment synthesizes the background of the relevant statutes and statutory
analyses in play when discussing the definition of a crime of violence for
the purposes of federal sentencing.29  In addition, Part II summarizes the
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R41461.html [Permalink unavailable]
(explaining the mandatory minimum of life imprisonment for defendants who
have been convicted of three violent felonies and examining the constitutionality
of the three-strikes provision).
24. See Stegner, supra note 13, at 184 (acknowledging circuit splits with re-
spect to violent crime classification, and calling for jurisdictional parallelism with
respect to classifying a particular crime as a crime of violence). See generally Bench,
supra note 1, at 214 (noting inherent confusion in defining violent crimes).
25. See Stegner, supra note 13, at 184 (noting circuit splits and calling for juris-
dictional parallelism with respect to classifying the crime of eluding police in a
vehicle as a crime of violence); Embrey, supra note 13, at 470 (seeking clarity on
the Tenth Circuit’s stance on whether certain crimes constitute crimes of
violence).
26. See United States v. Leaverton, 895 F.3d 1251, 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2018)
(conducting “modified categorical approach” with respect to an Oklahoma stat-
ute’s divisibility, and finding that manslaughter under the Oklahoma statute did
not qualify as a “crime of violence” for the purposes of federal sentencing en-
hancement). But see United States v. Smith, 882 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2018)
(holding that manslaughter as defined by a North Carolina state statute did qualify
as a crime of violence for the purposes of federal sentencing).
27. For a suggestion on how to ensure more parallel outcomes in determin-
ing what classifies as a crime of violence and how to better promote justice
amongst sentences, see infra notes 121–40.
28. See Bench, supra note 1, at 208 (seeking clarity on what constitutes a vio-
lent felony for the purposes of sentencing); Jondavid S. DeLong, What Constitutes
“Violent Felony” for Purpose of Sentence Enhancement under Armed Career Criminal Act (18
U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1)), 119 A.L.R. FED. 319, §§ 9-46 (1994) (noting cases of deci-
sion in determining what crimes are violent crimes, and observing differences on
the same kinds of crimes classification as violent or nonviolent predicate offenses).
29. For a full discussion of the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Three-
Strikes provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, see infra
5
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Tenth and Fourth Circuits’ approaches to determining whether particular
state manslaughter convictions qualify as crimes of violence in United States
v. Leaverton30 and United States v. Smith31, respectively.32  Part III provides a
critical analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Leaverton and the
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Smith, and shines a light on how the categori-
cal approach, modified categorical approach, and divisibility analysis fail
in yielding uniform results across jurisdictions for crimes that are almost
statutorily identical.33  Finally, Part IV discusses the impact of the failure to
produce consistent decisions regarding manslaughter as a crime of vio-
lence, and crimes of violence overall.34
II. THE PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT: BACKGROUND ON
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CASE LAW
Analyzing whether a particular predicate crime constitutes a crime of
violence for the purposes of sentencing in federal court requires piecing
together several moving parts.35  The first step in the process is to look at
the relevant statutory schemes that implicate sentencing enhancements
when crimes of violence have been previously committed.36  Secondly,
courts consider the particular approaches to categorizing those prior
crimes as a crime of violence or “violent felony” to decipher whether a
sentencing enhancement is appropriate.37  After deciding which approach
notes 39–55 and accompanying text.  For a full description the approaches
adopted by the courts in analyzing predicate crimes, namely the categorical and
modified categorical approaches, see infra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
30. 895 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding that Oklahoma manslaughter
conviction did not constitute a crime of violence under the federal sentencing
Guidelines).  For a full discussion of Leaverton, see infra notes 83–92 and accompa-
nying text.
31. 882 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that North Carolina manslaughter
conviction did qualify as a crime of violence for the purposes of federal sentenc-
ing).  For a full discussion of the facts and reasoning applied by the court in Smith,
see infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text.
32. For the background, facts, and court reasoning applied in Leaverton and
Smith, two recent Circuit Court cases analyzing state manslaughter convictions as
“crimes of violence,” see infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text.
33. For a critical analysis of the differing outcomes in Leaverton and Smith, see
infra notes 109–20 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion on the impact that differing definitions of manslaughter
as a crime of violence will have on federal sentencing, see infra notes 141–44 and
accompanying text.
35. See Mary Frances Richardson, Why the Categorical Approach Should Not Be
Used When Determining Whether An Offense is a Crime of Violence Under the Residual
Clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(C), 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1989, 2000–01 (2018) (giving a
background of the use of the categorical approach and how it fits in with analyzing
prior predicate offenses with respect to sentencing enhancement).
36. For a background on the statutes that implicate sentencing enhancements
for previously committed violent crimes, see infra notes 39–55 and accompanying
text.
37. For a discussion of the statutes and sentencing guidelines that impose sen-
tencing enhancement for previously committed crimes of violence, see infra notes
6
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to categorization is appropriate, courts analyze predicate crimes to deter-
mine whether they are violent, and then impose a sentence accordingly.38
A. Background on Relevant Statutes That Impose Sentence Enhancements for
Previous Crimes of Violence
Several statutes give rise for the need for an express definition of a
crime of violence or violent felony for the purposes of applying a sentenc-
ing enhancement.39  While the statutes discussed in this Comment differ
slightly, they each call for sentencing enhancements when a defendant
who has previously been convicted of crimes of violence is later sentenced
for a subsequent crime.40  In addition, they each employ the same ap-
proaches in defining whether a predicate crime qualifies as a crime of
violence.41  The two statutes this Comment explores are the Armed Crimi-
nal Career Act and the Violent Crime Control Act.
The Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA) calls for a sentencing en-
hancement regarding previous “violent crimes” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e).42  This statute applies when a defendant who has previously
been convicted of three or more felonies that “qualify” as a “violent fel-
ony” or “serious drug offense” is found possessing a firearm.43  As noted in
39–55 and accompanying text.  For a description of the two kinds of approaches
adopted by courts in analyzing predicate crimes, see infra notes 56–78 and accom-
panying text.
38. See Bench, supra note 1, at 209 (noting that courts use categorical or modi-
fied categorical approach to classify whether crimes are violent).
39. See William R. Maynard, “Statutory” Enhancement by Judicial Notice of Danger:
Who Needs Legislators or Jurors?, CHAMPION, January/February 2007, at 43 (noting
that previous convictions for “crimes of violence” or “violent felonies” can amount
to sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), The
Violent Crime Control Act (VCCA)’s three-strikes provision, and the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA)).  For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant statu-
tory schemes are the ACCA and the VCCA; however, as Maynard notes, the INA
“increases the maximum sentence for illegal reentry after deportation from two to
[twenty] years based on a prior conviction for an aggravated felony” or “crime of
violence.” See id. at 43.
40. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 864–65 (noting that the ACCA calls for
sentence enhancements for offenders who have committed previous violent
crimes).
41. See id. (noting that ACCA and the three-strikes provision of the VCCA
function similarly in defining crimes of violence).  O’Connor notes that “[t]he
structure and language used by the three-strikes provision bear a significant resem-
blance to both the ACCA’s ‘violent felony’ and the Career Offender provision’s
‘crime of violence’ definitions . . .  Although the three-strikes law lists qualifying
enumerated violent felonies with more detail than the ACCA and Career Offender
provision, all three statutes use almost identical language to define qualifying
nonenumerated crimes.” See id.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (providing that “a person who violates sec-
tion 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, . . . shall be fined under this title
and imprisoned not less than fifteen years”).
43. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 23 (explaining a number of
enhancements for sentencing with respect to firearms, and reporting data analysis
7
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Mathis v. United States,44 in determining whether a predicate crime will
qualify for the enhancement, the “ACCA defines the term ‘violent felony’
to include any felony, whether state or federal, that “is burglary, arson, or
extortion.”45  The accompanying career offender guidelines in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, section 4B1.2(a), further sets out what con-
stitutes a crime of violence for sentencing in conjunction with the
statute.46
on trends with respect to mandatory minimums and prevalence of particular fire-
arms offenses).  This publication gives the structural breakdown of 18 U.S.C. § 924
and how the parts of the statute function together. See id. at 8–10.  It particularly
notes that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) serves as the sentencing enhancement section for
crimes committed under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it a crime for a defen-
dant who has committed three or more violent felonies or serious drug offenses to
possess a firearm. See id. at 9–10.  The text also provides an explanation on the
appropriate corresponding United States Sentencing Guideline, USSG §4B1.4
(Armed Career Criminal), and provides a thorough explanation of what the guide-
lines instruct the sentencing court to consider and apply during the course of sen-
tencing. See id. at 11.
44. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
45. Id. at 2248 (citation omitted) (noting the ACCA’s definition of “violent
felony”).  In Mathis, the Court considered whether Mathis’ five prior state convic-
tions in Iowa for burglary qualified as predicate violent crimes in his current sen-
tencing, given that the convicting Iowa statute provides “alternative means of
fulfilling a single locational element.” See id. at 2250.  The Court in Mathis also
explained that in listing the particular crimes of burglary, arson, and extortion, the
legislation was specifically referring to their generic versions, and “not to all vari-
ants of the offenses.” Id. at 2248.  Finally, the Court also emphasized that a “prior
conviction does not qualify as the generic form of a predicate violent felony of-
fense listed in the ACCA if an element of the crime of conviction is broader than
an element of the generic offense.” See id.
46. See U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 (providing guidelines on what constitutes a crime of
violence for the purposes of the ACCA).  The Guidelines dictate:
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or
state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that—
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated as-
sault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or un-
lawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or
explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).
(b) The term “controlled substance offense” means an offense under fed-
eral or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dis-
pensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the pos-
session of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent
to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.
(c) The term “two prior felony convictions” means (1) the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at
least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense (i.e., two felony convictions of a crime of violence, two
felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, or one felony convic-
tion of a crime of violence and one felony conviction of a controlled sub-
stance offense), and (2) the sentences for at least two of the
aforementioned felony convictions are counted separately under the pro-
8
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Crimes of burglary, arson, and extortion are not the only crimes that
qualify as violent crimes under the ACCA.47  When considering predicate
crimes for ACCA sentencing, a court can also consider whether a crime fits
as a crime of violence under the ACCA’s “force clause.”48  In conducting a
force clause analysis, judges look to see if the predicate crime has an ele-
ment that includes “the use, attempted, or threatened use of physical
force against a person.”49  If the crime involves an element of force, then
those predicate crimes may also qualify as a crime of violence in the cur-
rent sentencing matter.50
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(VCCA) functions similarly in mandating a sentence enhancement based
on prior convictions for violent felonies.51  Well-known for its “three
visions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c). The date that a defendant sustained a
conviction shall be the date that the guilt of the defendant has been es-
tablished, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.
Id. While this amended guideline is still in application, it is important to note that
in United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the former “residual
clause” which was included in the guidelines of the Armed Criminal Career Act
was unconstitutional. See United States v. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding
the ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutional).  The residual clause of the act stated
that any felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physi-
cal injury to another” qualifies as a predicate violent felony for the purposes of
sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See id. at 2555 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)).  The Court held the clause unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the guarantee of due process provided by the Constitution. See id. at 2563.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006) (articulating that crimes other than
those enumerated can be held as crimes of violence under the ACCA’s force
clause).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (noting that if a predicate crime
“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another,” the prior conviction can be classified as a violent
felony); U.S. Sentencing Commission, The Categorical Approach: A Step-by-step Analy-
sis, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-train-
ing-seminar/2016/slideshow_categorical-approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/F33Z-
5U98] (discussing how to apply the categorical approach and the elements of stat-
utory language of the ACCA).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
50. See id. (directing that crimes that include force elements be considered
crimes of violence under the force clause); DeLong, supra note 28, at §§ 9–21 (pro-
viding examples in which courts have held crimes with the use of force as crimes of
violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act).  DeLong lists crimes that have
qualified under the ACCA for their force element: assault and battery, assault with
a deadly weapon, aggravated assault, attempted burglary, carrying concealed
weapon, criminal conspiracy, extortion, intimidating a witness, manslaughter, rape
or sexual battery, robbery, and storebreaking. See Delong, supra note 28, at
§§ 10–21.  As an introductory note, DeLong notes that these crimes have been
held to be predicate crimes of violence because such offenses had an element
including the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another. See Delong, supra note 28, at §§ 9–10.
51. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 863–65 (emphasizing that the analysis of
determining whether a predicate crime qualifies as a violent crime under the
ACCA or the VCCA’s three-strikes provision is largely the same, as they each use
the formal categorical approach adopted in Taylor).  O’Connor also notes that
9
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strikes” provision, the statute provides for a sentencing enhancement of
mandatory life imprisonment if a person has been convicted of three vio-
lent felonies.52  The statute gives a comprehensive list of what federal
crimes constitute a serious violent felony, such as murder, manslaughter
other than involuntary manslaughter, various forms of assault, and a multi-
tude of others that qualify as violence or acts that threaten violence if com-
mitted at the federal level.53  If the crime has been committed at the state
level, however, it does not necessarily match the elements of a federally-
enumerated offense.54  Thus, sentencing courts need to analyze the con-
victing state’s statute to determine whether the state-level predicate crime
qualifies as a crime of violence in a federal sentencing matter.55
“[t]he language and definitional structure related to classifying prior convictions
for sentence enhancement in the ACCA, Career Offender provision and the three-
strikes law are almost identical.” See id. at 851.
52. See Congressional Research Service, Three Strike Mandatory Sentencing (18
U.S.C. 3559(c)): An Overview, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM, at 1–4 (2010), https://
www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R41461.html [https://perma.cc/R6LH-227E]
(providing a summary of the federal three-strikes provision and qualifying predi-
cate offenses, and discussing the constitutionality of the three-strikes provision).
The three-strikes provision will apply if the defendant in a case has two prior con-
victions for violent felonies, and the felony in the current hearing is also classified
as violent. See id. at 1; see also Nkechi Taifa, “Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out”- Mandatory
Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 717–18 (explain-
ing the legislative history behind the VCCA).  Taifa argues that three-strikes provi-
sions are “constitutionally suspect,” and “constitute bad public policy,” because
they can sometimes impose life imprisonment for fairly minor crimes. See Taifa,
supra, at 717.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(F) (2006) (listing all of the enumerated offenses that
qualify as serious violent felonies).  The list includes the following crimes:
a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever commit-
ted, consisting of murder (as described in section 1111); manslaughter
other than involuntary manslaughter (as described in section 1112); as-
sault with intent to commit murder (as described in section 113(a)); as-
sault with intent to commit rape; aggravated sexual abuse and sexual
abuse (as described in sections 2241 and 2242); abusive sexual contact (as
described in sections 2244 (a)(1) and (a)(2)); kidnapping; aircraft piracy
(as described in section 46502 of Title 49); robbery (as described in sec-
tion 2111, 2113, or 2118); carjacking (as described in section 2119); ex-
tortion; arson; firearms use; firearms possession (as described in section
924(c)); or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the
above offenses; and any other offense punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another or that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
Id.
54. For a full discussion of the importance of elements matching in state and
federal offenses for the classification of violent crimes, see infra notes 56–78 and
accompanying text.
55. For a full discussion of the approaches used by federal courts in sentenc-
ing hearings to determine if a predicate crime qualifies as a crime of violence
(both the categorical approach under Taylor and the modified categorical ap-
proach), see infra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
10
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B. Background on Prior State Offenses and Predicate Crime Classification:
Approaches Adopted by Courts in Categorizing Previous Crimes as
“Violent”
Historically, the question of whether a particular crime committed at
the state level qualifies as a predicate crime or crime of violence requires a
complex analysis.56  State statutes differ across the nation for similar
crimes, and also vary in required elements to convict defendants of similar
crimes.57  Most importantly, state crimes are not enumerated in the fed-
eral statutes that impose sentencing enhancements.58  Thus, deciding
whether a particular state statute’s elements align with federal elements
for predicate crime classification largely requires sentencing judges to
carefully compare state and federal laws and the elements required for
conviction under each.59
In classifying predicate crimes, courts can use either the categorical
approach or the modified categorical approach to determine if a previous
state-level felony conviction is a violent felony.60  In most cases, the judge
56. See DeLong, supra note 28, at 319 (providing examples of the various types
of predicate offenses that have qualified as violent crimes under the ACCA, includ-
ing: assaults, manslaughter, sex crimes, and other offenses involved serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another). See generally Stegner, supra note 13, at
187–90.
57. See Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, A True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States
and the Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (2017) (noting that even
when states give a crime the same label, “the elements of the offenses” may be
different).
58. See Sharpless, supra note 57, at 1280 (“[I]t is impractical for federal sen-
tencing enhancement and federal deportation laws to cross-reference specific state
criminal laws.”).
59. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (holding that federal
sentencing courts must consider the elements of a state statute in comparison to a
federal statute when classifying predicate crimes as crimes of violence); U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission, supra note 48 (emphasizing that courts must consider the
elements of a predicate conviction in classifying it as a crime of violence, as op-
posed to the facts of a case).
60. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–64 (2013) (noting the
differences in applying the modified categorical approach and categorical ap-
proach in classifying predicate crimes as violent crimes).  In Descamps, the defen-
dant faced sentencing for his present conviction under the ACCA for being a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm. See id. at 259.  The Court was tasked
with considering whether Descamps’s prior conviction for burglary under Califor-
nia law (a statute that contains a “single, indivisible set of elements”) qualified as
an Armed Criminal Career Act predicate violent felony. See id. at 258.  The Court
then clarified that when a state statute has an “indivisible set of elements,” the
modified categorical approach does not apply and the courts should use the tradi-
tional categorical approach as detailed in Taylor v. United States. See id.; Sharpless,
supra note 57, at 1284 (discussing when it is proper to apply the modified categori-
cal approach versus the Taylor approach); see also 27 No. 17 CRIM. PRAC. REP. 2
(reiterating that “Courts may not apply the modified categorical approach to de-
termine whether a prior conviction was for a violent felony under the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act (ACCA) when the crime of which the defendant was convicted
contains a single, indivisible set of elements”).  As one scholar explains, the modi-
fied categorical approach is different from the original approach introduced in
11
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adopts the traditional categorical approach as introduced by the Supreme
Court in Taylor v. United States.61  In Taylor, the Court considered whether
the defendant’s previous conviction for second-degree burglary under a
Missouri statute classified as a prior violent felony when sentencing him
for illegal possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).62  If the
second-degree burglary classified as a predicate crime, the defendant
would receive a sentencing enhancement providing him with a minimum
of fifteen years of incarceration.63
In analyzing whether the defendant’s prior Missouri second-degree
burglary conviction classified as a crime of violence, the Court reasoned
that examining only the particular facts of the prior conviction (rather
than analyzing the statute under which the defendant was convicted)
would create a faulty analysis.64  Thus, the Court upheld an approach that
Taylor because it allows “looking beyond the statute to the record of conviction,”
and in Descamps, the Court directly addressed under what “circumstances” a sen-
tencing court could employ the modified categorical approach. See Sharpless,
supra note 57, at 1283–85.
61. 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (holding that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . . generally
requires the trial court to look only to the fact of the conviction and the statutory
definition of the prior offense”).  The Court in Taylor considered whether the de-
fendant’s prior second-degree burglary charge under a Missouri statute classified
as a violent crime in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for the purposes of ap-
plying the fifteen-year sentencing enhancement. See id. at 580.  After concluding
that the categorical approach was the proper way to classify the predicate offense,
the Court remanded the case for further proceedings in order to let the lower
courts determine whether the conviction sufficed. See id. at 602.
62. See id. at 578–79 (noting that the issue in the case was whether a Missouri
second-degree burglary charge qualified as a predicate crime of violence).  Impor-
tantly, the Court also noted that the defendant had a total of four prior convic-
tions: in addition to the Missouri second-degree burglary charge, Taylor had a
previous second-degree burglary charge under Missouri law, and other convictions
for robbery and assault. See id. at 578.  Because the defendant “conceded” that his
robbery and assault convictions qualified as predicate crimes for the purposes of
his current sentencing, he challenged his second-degree burglary convictions as
predicate crimes by asserting that those two convictions did not pose “serious po-
tential risk of physical injur[ies] to another,” and thus did not qualify as predicate
violent felonies. See id. at 579.
63. See id. at 578 (explaining that “[u]nder 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlaw-
ful for a person who has been convicted previously for a felony to possess a fire-
arm.  A defendant convicted for a violation of § 922(g)(1) is subject to the
sentence-enhancement provision at issue, § 924(e): ‘(1) In the case of a person
who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any
court . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both . . . such person
shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen
years.’”).  The Court explained that as part of the defendant’s guilty plea, he
agreed to be sentenced at the district court to the fifteen years provided under the
statute, but his plea was “conditioned on the right to appeal this issue.” See id. at
579.
64. See id. at 600–02 (providing three reasons that analyzing the specific facts
of a conviction would create a flawed analysis in labeling predicate convictions as
violent felonies).  The Court gave three reasons: (1) the language of section
924(e) supports the proposition of not considering the facts of a defendants case;
(2) the legislative history of the enhancement suggests that “Congress generally
12
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supported looking solely at the convicting statute in classifying a defen-
dant’s prior crime as violent.65
Following Taylor’s rule, after analyzing the relevant state conviction
statute, the sentencing court in a particular matter must then compare the
conviction elements of the state crime to the elements of the generic
crime as defined federally.66  As critics have noted, the categorical ap-
proach is rooted in considering elements, and comparing the “elements of
the prior offense with elements required by the enhancement law.”67  If
the elements match closely in the eyes of the court, or the state statute is
took a categorical approach to predicate offenses”; and (3) taking factual consider-
ations could create “practical difficulties and potential unfairness,” such as present-
ing witnesses from the old crimes at the sentencing phase, or difficulties where
there was no record from a plea indicating the underlying facts of the conviction.
See id.
65. See id. (supporting an approach that solely looks at the convicting statute
in classifying a predicate crime for the three reasons).  For a list of the three rea-
sons the Taylor court referenced in upholding this approach, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text.  One scholar has described the categorical approach as a “fun-
damental tool” in classifying prior convictions as violent. See Richardson, supra
note 35, at 2000–01 (explaining that the categorical approach is a process with
four steps, and explaining those steps).  As Richardson notes, the four-step process
works in the following manner:
First, a court identifies the definition at issue, such as violent felony in the
ACCA or crime of violence in § 16.  Second, a court determines the stat-
ute of the conviction, and, if the statute is divisible into separate crimes,
will use the modified categorical approach to identify which crime is cur-
rently at issue.  Third, a court identifies the elements of the statute of the
conviction.  Fourth and last, a court is the elements of the statute of con-
viction to the definition at issue.
See id. at 2001–02.  Richardson also provides a thorough background of the “gene-
sis” of the categorical approach and its evolution, providing additional explanation
of the Court’s decision in Taylor. See id. at 2003–04. See generally Ted Koehler,
Assessing Divisibility in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1521,
1523–24 (2012) (discussing methods in assessing whether a statute is divisible with
respect to analysis under the categorical or modified categorical approach).
66. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (holding that comparison of the elements of a
state conviction to the elements of a federal conviction is necessary).  The Court
specifically held that an offense constitutes “burglary” for purposes of a § 924(e)
sentence enhancement if either its statutory definition substantially corresponds to
“generic” burglary, or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required
the jury to find all the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defen-
dant. See id.  The court in United States v. Leaverton also gave a helpful description
of the comparison of crimes committed at the state level to the federal definitions,
noting that to determine whether a state crime meets the generic definition, “we
look not to the facts of the particular prior case, but instead to whether the state
statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal
definition.”  United States v. Leaverton, 895 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2018) (cit-
ing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (internal quotations omitted)); see
also U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 48 (explaining how to apply the cate-
gorical approach, and emphasizing that “only the elements of the conviction can
be considered,” not the facts of a case or the name of the convicting statute).
67. See Maynard, supra note 39, at 46 (explaining how the categorical ap-
proach introduced in Taylor functions and noting importance of comparison of
statutory elements in applying categorical approach); see also Richardson, supra
13
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narrower than the generic crime as elementally described under federal
law, then the prior conviction can be classified as a predicate violent fel-
ony for the purposes of sentencing in the present matter.68
Nevertheless, if the state statute is broader than the generic federal
crime, the analysis is not quite as simple.69  In considering this difficulty,
but not applied directly in Taylor, the Court in Taylor set the stage for a
“modified categorical approach.”70  Under the modified categorical ap-
proach, a sentencing court can look past the sole statutory definition of
the predicate conviction, and consider items such as charging papers and
jury instructions to determine the particular elements of the defendant’s
predicate offense.71  Following a determination of the specific elements a
defendant is convicted of, the court can then decide whether those ele-
ments specific to the particular defendant amount to a predicate violent
felony for the purposes of applying the sentencing enhancement.72  After
note 35, at 2001–02 (explaining four steps necessary in applying categorical
approach).
68. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599 (holding that “[i]f the state statute is narrower
than the generic view . . . there is no problem, because the conviction necessarily
implies that the defendant has been found guilty of all the elements of generic
burglary”).
69. See id. at 600 (questioning whether when defendant has been convicted
under statute of “nongeneric” burglary, sentencing enhancement for prior generic
burglary applies).  In conducting its analysis, the Taylor Court noted that answering
this question required deciding whether statutory definitions were all that can be
considered in such cases, or “whether the court may consider other evidence.” See
id. (explaining how under formal categorical approach, courts of appeals have
looked only to statutory definition of prior offenses).
70. See id. at 602 (holding that “[the] categorical approach, however, may per-
mit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow
range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic
burglary”).  The example the Court provided in making this determination in-
volved a state’s burglary statute that required entry of either an automobile or a
building; in such a case, the Court noted, the sentencing court could consult an
indictment or jury instructions in order to assess what part of the statute the defen-
dant was convicted under. See id. (explaining when government could use this
type of conviction for enhancement).
71. See id. (observing when modified categorical approach may be appropri-
ate); see also O’Connor, supra note 14, at 862–63 (summarizing Taylor and discuss-
ing Court’s adoption of categorical approach and introduction of modified
categorical approach).  The Court in Taylor noted that:
This categorical approach, however, may permit the sentencing court to
go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a
jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.
For example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an auto-
mobile as well as a building, if the indictment or information and jury
instructions show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of
a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building
to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction
for enhancement.
See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (explaining when courts can look beyond mere statutory
language for sentencing enhancements).
72. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (holding that nongeneric form of burglary
under state law, in this case, would qualify as predicate offense for purposes of
14
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Taylor established the modified categorical approach, courts could apply it
in situations where the defendant’s conviction itself did not provide clarity
on the specific elements the court had convicted the defendant under.73
The modified categorical approach is only appropriate when the state stat-
ute is considered “divisible,” or gives a number of separate elements that
defendants may have met in their individual convictions.74
More recently, in Shepard v. United States,75 the Court revisited the
modified categorical approach and discussed what particular documents a
sentencing court could consider in assessing a prior violent felony convic-
tion under the caveat presented in Taylor.76  In Shepard, the Supreme
Court held that when using the modified categorical approach, sentenc-
ing courts may only consider the “charging document, written plea agree-
ment, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the
sentencing if, instead of elements itself, accompanying papers like jury instructions
or charging papers showed that defendant had committed elements of generic
burglary).
73. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (noting that
courts can use modified categorical approach in situations where statute lists sev-
eral potential offense elements and it is unclear which particular subsection defen-
dant has been convicted under).
74. See United States v. Leaverton, 895 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2018) (not-
ing that “[t]he modified categorical approach applies only when a statute sets out
alternative elements, rather than alternative means”); see also United States v. Tittles,
852 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that divisible statute is one that
“sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative” and that courts
considering a prior conviction under a divisible statute apply the “modified cate-
gorical approach . . . to identify the elements of the crime of conviction”). In
Tittles, the defendant pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm but argued as
to whether his previous conviction for “feloniously pointing a firearm” under
Oklahoma law qualified as a predicate felony under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. See id. at 1262 (explaining background facts and defendant’s previous convic-
tion).  Ultimately, after deciding that the statute the defendant was convicted
under was divisible because it set out alternative elements, the court applied the
modified categorical approach to analyze the Oklahoma statute. See id. at 1277–82
(explaining why courts use modified categorical approach).  In applying the modi-
fied categorical approach, the Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that the ele-
ment that the defendant had pleaded guilty to was pointing a firearm at a woman
with the “purpose of threatening her,” which qualified as a predicate violent felony
for the purposes of his present sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
See id. at 1282 (finding defendant was convicted of violent felony after applying
modified categorical approach).
75. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
76. See id. at 26 (concluding that charging documents and written plea agree-
ments are documents that can be considered under modified categorical approach
in determining what elements of particular statute defendant was convicted
under).  In Shepard, the defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 992(g) for being
a felon in possession of a firearm; the Court considered whether the defendant’s
conviction under one of Massachusetts’ burglary statutes qualified as a “predicate
ACCA offense.” See id. at 16 (describing relevant facts).  In holding that charging
documents and written plea agreements could be considered in determining the
elements of a particular statute a defendant is convicted under, while police re-
ports could not be considered in assessing the prior crime, the Court remanded
the case for resentencing. See id. at 26 (remanding case for further proceedings).
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trial judge to which the defendant assented.”77  Therefore, when applying
the modified categorical approach and determining what documents are
admissible in conducting the approach, courts consider whether a docu-
ment qualifies as a “Shepard” document.78
C. Background on Recent Circuit Court Cases Defining State Manslaughter
Convictions as Crimes of Violence or Violent Felonies
One particular offense that has recently garnered review by several
courts of appeals has been the state-level offense of manslaughter.79  In
two recent cases, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals came to different conclusions on whether particular
state convictions for manslaughter classified as crimes of violence or vio-
77. See id. at 26 (holding that admissible documents under modified categori-
cal approach are limited to “charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for
the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of
this information”).  In its reasoning, the Court in Shepard explained that allowing
any addition documents would be inconsistent with precedent introduced in Tay-
lor. See id. at 23 (noting importance of adhering to precedent case law); see also
Richardson, supra note 35, at 2000–09 (explaining the ruling in Shepard, and not-
ing that the plurality opinion stated that “evidence judges may look to under Taylor
should not be extended to include anything beyond what the categorical approach
allows”); Sharpless, supra note 57, at 1282–83 (noting Shepard was “major develop-
ment regarding the categorical approach”).
78. See United States v. Leaverton, 895 F.3d 1251, 1252–55 (10th Cir. 2018)
(noting that docket sheets are not “Shepard documents”); see also United States v.
Abeyta, 877 F.3d 935, 943 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating that “Shepard documents are
limited to conclusive records made or used in adjudicating guilt”).  In Abeyta, the
defendant was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the court, in considering his enhancement sentence (which
was not for three prior violent felonies, but did consider his prior crimes for the
purposes of his criminal history score) analyzed whether the defendant’s prior
crime for “damaging, defacing, or destruction of private property under Denver
Revised Municipal Code” could factor into his criminal history score as a state-level
offense. See id. at 938–39 (providing background information on defendant’s
prior convictions).  Ultimately, the court held that it could not use the modified
categorical approach in the defendant’s case, and the defendant’s ordinance viola-
tion did not factor into his criminal history score. See id. at 942 (explaining modi-
fied categorical approach could not be used in this case).
79. See Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1251–58 (holding Oklahoma  manslaughter con-
viction did not qualify as crime of violence for purposes of sentencing, because
Oklahoma statute was too generic in comparison to federal statute); see also United
States v. Smith, 882 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that North Carolina volun-
tary manslaughter conviction did constitute crime of violence under Armed Career
Criminal Act, specifically under force clause of act, as North Carolina’s statute has
force element); United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that involuntary manslaughter also qualifies as crime of violence under ACCA).
While not discussed at length in this Comment due to the differences of the state-
level charge (between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter), Chauncey stands
for the proposition that, as a matter of law, even involuntary manslaughter can
qualify as a crime of violence, as it poses a significant risk of physical injury to
another. See id. at 878 (citing United States v. Newton, 259 F.3d 964 (8th Cir.
2001)).
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lent felonies for sentencing in later cases committed by the same defen-
dant.80  In Leaverton, the Tenth Circuit found that a conviction for
Oklahoma manslaughter did not constitute a crime of violence.81  Con-
versely, in Smith, the Fourth Circuit held that a North Carolina voluntary
manslaughter conviction did qualify as a crime of violence.82
1. United States v. Leaverton
In United States v. Leaverton,83 the Tenth Circuit considered whether a
defendant’s conviction for first-degree manslaughter under an Oklahoma
statute qualified as a crime of violence for the purposes of the three-strikes
provision provided in 18 U.S.C § 3559(c).84  After finding the Oklahoma
statute divisible, the court in Leaverton applied the modified categorical
approach to determine if a subsection of the first-degree manslaughter
statute qualified as a violent felony.85  An analysis indicated that the defen-
dant was likely convicted under Oklahoma Statute Title 21 Section 711(2),
and that the wording of that particular subsection arose to qualification of
80. See Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1251 (holding Oklahoma manslaughter in first
degree to not be crime of violence); see also Smith, 882 F.3d at 460 (holding North
Carolina voluntary manslaughter conviction as crime of violence for purposes of
classifying predicate violent offenses).
81. See Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1251 (holding Oklahoma manslaughter in first
degree to not be crime of violence).
82. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 460 (holding North Carolina voluntary manslaugh-
ter as crime of violence).
83. 895 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2018).
84. See Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1254 (considering whether 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)
sentencing enhancement for three prior violent felonies should apply in sentenc-
ing for Leaverton’s conviction of three counts of bank robbery).  The defendant
contended that his conviction for Oklahoma manslaughter did not qualify as a
violent felony under the VCCA. See id. at 1253, 1256 (noting the defendant’s
timely appeal after the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment and dis-
cussing the defendant’s argument that his prior conviction was not the equivalent
of federal manslaughter).  According to the court, “[t]he sole point of contention
was whether Leaverton’s prior conviction for Oklahoma Manslaughter I qualified
as a serious violent felony.” See id. at 1253 (citing OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 711).
85. See id. at 1255 (applying modified categorical approach to classify
Leaverton’s conviction).  As the court in Leaverton explained, the Oklahoma stat-
ute had three subsections for a manslaughter conviction:
Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the following cases: 1.
When perpetrated without a design to effect death by a person while en-
gaged in the commission of a misdemeanor.; 2. When perpetrated with-
out a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and
unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is commit-
ted under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homi-
cide.; 3. When perpetrated unnecessarily either while resisting an attempt
by the person killed to commit a crime, or after such attempt shall have
failed.
See id. at 1254 (citing OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 711).  The government argued that the
court convicted the defendant under subsection 2 of the Oklahoma statute, relying
largely on the state court’s docket sheet as evidence. See id. at 1254–55.
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a serious violent felony and was equitable to voluntary manslaughter.86
However, the court did not complete the predicate crime analysis by sim-
ply designating that a manslaughter in the first degree conviction could be
deemed a serious violent felony .87  The opinion noted that, “[W]e do not
simply apply an enhancement to any crime designated by a state as ‘man-
slaughter.’”88  Next, the court applied the “general approach, in designat-
ing predicate offenses, of using uniform categorical definitions” to
compare the state crime against the generic crime definitions provided in
the federal statute.89
As noted in Taylor, the state offense must be a “categorical match with
a generic federal offense,” meaning that the facts underlying the state of-
fense would also secure a conviction at the federal level for manslaugh-
ter.90  After comparing the statutes, the court held that the statutory
definitions did not match because the Oklahoma manslaughter statute
stated that the heat of passion conviction requirement would be “so great
as to destroy the intent to kill,” thus eliminating the element of intentional
86. See id. (concluding that wording of Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute con-
stituted crime of violence).  The district court in Leaverton held that subsection 2 of
Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute was the subsection that the defendant was con-
victed under, given that the docket sheet reflected it. See id. at 1255 (citing OKLA.
STAT. TIT. 21, § 711).  While the court in Leaverton did compare subsection 2 to
federal generic manslaughter, the court did not make its own review or its own
determination if that was the subsection that Leaverton was actually convicted
under. See id. at 1255–56 (skipping to comparison of conviction under § 711(2)
with manslaughter under federal law, instead of determining the specific subsec-
tion Leaverton was convicted under).  Instead, the Leaverton court noted that
docket sheets are not one of the documents noted in Shepard permitted as evidence
when determining which part of a divisible statute that a defendant was convicted
under. See id. at 1255 (concluding docket sheets are not Shepard documents).  The
court also noted that even if documents could prove that the defendant was con-
victed under subsection 2 of the Oklahoma manslaughter statute the conviction
still did not suffice as a violent crime for the sentencing enhancement after com-
pleting the comparison deemed necessary in Taylor. See id. 1255–57 (citing Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990)).  For a full discussion of the necessary
comparison of state and federal statutes as described in Taylor, see supra notes
60–78 and accompanying text.
87. See id. at 1256 (explaining that analysis under modified categorical ap-
proach does not end after classifying conviction under state statute as “serious vio-
lent felony”).
88. See id. (noting that analysis under modified categorical approach includes
comparing state language that qualifies as a serious violent felony with its federal
counterpart).
89. See id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590) (explaining that after applying
modified categorical approach the court must compare state crime’s statute to ge-
neric federal statute).
90. See id. at 1256–57 (“‘Accordingly, a state offense is a categorical match
with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense necessarily
involved facts equating to the generic federal offense.’” (quoting Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013)).  For a full discussion of the decision in Taylor
and what is required under the categorical approach and comparing a state level
crime to that at the federal level, see supra note 48–59 and accompanying text.
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killing required federally.91  The court therefore concluded that the de-
fendant’s Oklahoma manslaughter conviction did not equate to the fed-
eral definition of “generic manslaughter,” and accordingly did not qualify
as a crime of violence warranting a sentence enhancement.92
2. United States v. Smith
In United States v. Smith,93 the Fourth Circuit faced an issue similar to
that presented in Leaverton: analyzing a state manslaughter conviction for
the purposes of applying a federal violent felony sentencing enhance-
ment.94  In Smith, the court considered whether the defendant’s prior vol-
untary manslaughter conviction under a North Carolina statute qualified
as a violent felony for the purposes of the sentencing enhancement re-
flected in the ACCA.95
91. See id. at 1257 (comparaing Oklahoma’s statute with federal statute for
manslaughter).  The Leaverton court noted that Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute
requirements are a minority viewpoint, and that most other states, in addition to
the Model Penal Code, require that despite there being a heat of passion for vol-
untary manslaughter, there is still some intent to kill in addition to a circumstance
that induced some kind of provocation. See id. (citing Brown v. State, 777 P.2d
1355, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989)).
92. See id. at 1257–58 (concluding Leaverton’s offense does not equate to fed-
eral generic manslaughter).  As the court explained in Leaverton, the Model Penal
Code (MPC) gives the best generic definition of manslaughter. See id. at 1256–57
(citing United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 2011)).  In con-
ducting its comparison of the MPC definition of manslaughter with the defen-
dant’s conviction under Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute, the court noted that
the MPC definition of manslaughter is “a homicide ‘committed recklessly,’ or a
homicide that would be murder except that it was ‘committed under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable expla-
nation or excuse.’” See id. at 1257 (citing Model Penal Code § 210.3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1962)).  In comparing this definition to Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute,
the court noted that “[u]nlike generic manslaughter under a heat of passion the-
ory, a conviction under § 711(2) requires that the defendant did not intend to
kill.” Id. (explaining differences between generic manslaughter and manslaughter
under Oklahoma’s statute).  Because the Oklahoma statute was thus markedly dif-
ferent in providing that the defendant did not have the intention to kill, the court
concluded that Oklahoma manslaughter was not equitable to generic manslaugh-
ter and thus did not qualify as manslaughter that would count as a crime of vio-
lence as defined under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c). See id. at 1258 (reversing and
remanding district court’s decision).
93. 882 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 2018).
94. For a full discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Leaverton (examin-
ing whether state manslaughter conviction qualified as predicate crime for pur-
poses of three-strikes sentence enhancement under VCCA) and the reasoning
applied by the court in deciding that the defendant’s Oklahoma manslaughter
conviction did not qualify as a predicate crime of violence, see supra notes 83–92
and accompanying text.
95. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 462 (noting that issue was predicate crime classifica-
tion for Smith’s North Carolina voluntary manslaughter conviction).  In Smith, the
defendant was at the time being sentenced in conjunction with conviction of one
count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and one count
of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. See id. at 462 (explaining facts
of case).  Smith’s three prior violent felonies included two counts of felony robbery
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In contrast to the analysis in Leaverton, the court in Smith did not need
to utilize the modified categorical approach because the North Carolina
statute did not require a divisibility analysis.96  The divisibility analysis is
only relevant when a statute lists a variety of “elements of the offense in
the alternative.”97  Thus, the court used only the categorical approach in
reaching its conclusion.98  The defendant in Smith, like the defendant in
Leaverton, was convicted of the equivalent of voluntary manslaughter at the
state level; however, the North Carolina statute was not a “divisible” statute
and laid out all of the elements of the offense without leaving room for
interpretation regarding what section the defendant was convicted
under.99  The most important element in Smith, and in North Carolina’s
statute, was the intent element listed for voluntary manslaughter, because
the intent element reflected the intuitive need to apply intentional force
against another person.100
In applying the standard categorical approach described in Taylor, the
court in Smith compared the North Carolina voluntary manslaughter stat-
ute to the ACCA’s requirements.101  In its comparison, the Fourth Circuit
noted that North Carolina’s voluntary manslaughter statute required the
intent to kill.102  In comparing the North Carolina statutory language to
with a dangerous weapon, and the count of voluntary manslaughter analyzed in
the opinion. See id. at 462 (stating that Smith argued that voluntary manslaughter
did not qualify as violent felony).  The district court applied the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See id.
(noting district court did not agree with Smith’s interpretation of voluntary man-
slaughter statute).  Counsel for the defendant appealed on the grounds that volun-
tary manslaughter under North Carolina law did not qualify as a violent felony
under the ACCA “because it can be committed with a mens rea of mere negligence
or recklessness.” See id. (asserting that the Court reviews this issue de novo).
96. See id. at 463 (noting that court applied the categorical approach).
97. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (explaining divisible stat-
ute and alternative elements).
98. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 463 (applying categorical approach to classify
Smith’s voluntary manslaughter conviction).  The Smith court did not mention the
modified categorical approach, and solely proceeded with the categorical ap-
proach to consider whether conviction under the North Carolina voluntary man-
slaughter statute is “categorically violent.” See id. (“We therefore begin with the
elements of the North Carolina crime of voluntary manslaughter before consider-
ing whether this crime is categorically violent.”).
99. See id. (emphasizing importance of looking to wording and elements of
North Carolina voluntary manslaughter statute rather than defendant’s conduct).
The court in Smith noted that “voluntary manslaughter in North Carolina is ‘the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied, and without
premeditation and deliberation.’” See id. (citing State v. McNeil, 518 S.E.2d 486
(N.C. 1999)).
100. See id. at 463–64 (noting that element of intent in North Carolina volun-
tary manslaughter charging establishes intent required for ACCA’s force clause).
101. See id. at 463 (considering “the elements of the North Carolina crime of
voluntary manslaughter before considering whether this crime is categorically
violent”).
102. See id. (discussing intent required by North Carolina’s voluntary man-
slaughter conviction).  For the language of the North Carolina voluntary man-
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that of the ACCA and accompanying Federal Sentencing Guidelines that
call for enhancement, the court concluded that the necessity of force re-
quired under the North Carolina statute qualified the conviction as a vio-
lent felony.103  Specifically, the North Carolina manslaughter conviction
qualified under the ACCA’s use-of-force clause, because an intentional
killing “plainly involves ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force against the person of another.’”104  Thus, the court concluded
that the defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in North Caro-
lina satisfied the criteria of a violent felony and upheld the sentence en-
hancement imposed by the district court.105
slaughter statute, see supra note 99.  In addition to its examination of the statutory
language itself, the court in Smith explained that North Carolina Pattern Jury In-
structions require “that the defendant killed the victim by an intentional and un-
lawful act,” further substantiating that North Carolina voluntary manslaughter
requires an intentional killing and that is what the jury is asked to find in assessing
a defendant’s guilt. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 464 (citing N.C. Crim. Jury Instr.
206.40).  Finally, the court made the point that North Carolina’s voluntary man-
slaughter statute essentially has the same requirements as an intentional, first-de-
gree murder, with an exception that “the defendant’s reason is temporarily
suspended by legally adequate provocation” or temporary justification. See id. (cit-
ing State v. Rainey, 574 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).
103. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 464 (observing that Supreme Court jurisprudence
in Leocal v. Ashcroft “makes clear that the ‘use’ in the force clause of ACCA requires
that the force involved in the qualifying offense be volitional” and because the
North Carolina manslaughter statute requires an intentional killing, the crime
then qualified as a violent felony under the use-of-force clause); see also Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (noting that the ACCA requires a higher threshold
than negligence for crimes committed, and that intentional conduct does qualify
under the ACCA).
104. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 464 (quoting ACCA’s “use-of-force clause” in 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)).
105. See id. (upholding classification of manslaughter conviction as violent fel-
ony and thus upholding district court’s sentence enhancement).  In its analysis in
Smith, the Fourth Circuit also cited the opinions of its sister courts in which they
have upheld that voluntary manslaughter convictions under other state statutes
qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. See id. (noting that in similar circum-
stances other circuits have reached the same conclusion).  The Smith court noted
that the Sixth Circuit held that a conviction under Georgia’s voluntary manslaugh-
ter statute qualified as a violent felony, and the Eight Circuit held that conviction
under Missouri’s voluntary manslaughter statute qualified as a violent felony. See
id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 655 Fed. App’x. 290 (6th Cir. 2016); then citing
United States v. Lambers, 527 Fed. App’x. 586 (8th Cir. 2013)).  The court also
noted, in explaining its decision and relating to the decisions of its sister courts,
that voluntary manslaughter can be classified as “a violent felony for purposes of
ACCA if it proscribes conduct that would otherwise be murder except for circum-
stances that served as partial justification for the conduct.” See id. (stating that
“[a]ny other conclusion would strain North Carolina law beyond the breaking
point”).
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III. THE SENTENCING HEARING: CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND HOW CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE NEEDS AN “ENHANCEMENT”
Recent case law defining separate states’ equivalent of voluntary man-
slaughter as a crime of violence leaves two questions unanswered: (1) why
do essentially the same crimes differ with respect to classification as a
crime of violence, and (2) how can we create a system that enforces more
uniform classifications across jurisdictions in order to give similar offend-
ers parallel classifications and sentences?106  First, this section analyzes
why Leaverton and Smith yielded different results in conducting their analy-
ses of the manslaughter statutes in Oklahoma and North Carolina.107  Sec-
ond, this section provides suggestions on how to improve the states’
predicate crime analyses to afford better consistency in results across all
jurisdictions—despite the fact that state statutes are not always parallel.108
A. The Predicate Crime: Inconsistent Application of Whether Manslaughter Is a
Violent Felony for Federal Sentencing
The circuit courts deciding Leaverton and Smith were essentially tasked
with analyzing the same issue: did each defendant’s prior manslaughter
conviction amount to a predicate violent crime in their current sentenc-
ing?109  The difference in outcomes was not so much the defendant’s con-
duct in each case, but instead, the specific language of the state statute
that each defendant was convicted under.110  Both defendants were
106. For a full discussion of the statutes that require enhanced sentences for
criminals with predicate crimes of violence, see supra notes 39–55 and accompany-
ing text.  For a more specific discussion on the classification of two different states’
voluntary manslaughter classification, see supra notes 79–105 and accompanying
text.
107. For a critical analysis of why the courts in Leaverton and Smith reached
different results in analyzing their respective state statutes, see infra notes 109–120
and accompanying text.
108. For a critical analysis of the difficulties in uniformly classifying predicate
crimes and suggestions of different ways to improve the jurisprudence regarding
classifications of predicate crimes under the ACCA and the VCCA of 1994, see
infra notes 109–40 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the differing outcomes in Leaverton and Smith, and
each court’s analysis of whether particular state convictions for voluntary man-
slaughter qualified as predicate crimes in the defendant’s subsequent sentencing
for a separate crime, see supra notes 79–105 and accompanying text, explaining
Leaverton and Smith.
110. Compare United States v. Leaverton, 895 F.3d 1251, 1257–58 (10th Cir.
2018) (noting that defendant was convicted under divisible state statute, and con-
victing elements that Leaverton was convicted under were too broad in compari-
son to the federal generic requirements (citing OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 711)) with
United States v. Smith, 882 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that North Caro-
lina’s manslaughter conviction requires an intentional killing, which implies force
element).  The main difference is that the Oklahoma statute was both divisible and
too broad according to the court, and conversely, the North Carolina statute was
very specific, and thus its narrow nature aided in meeting the federal guidelines
for predicate crimes (despite the fact that the crime charged in each case was
nearly identical under name). See Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1257–58 (holding
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charged and convicted of their state’s equivalent of manslaughter; the dif-
ference was not necessarily the crime itself, but the way that their convict-
ing statutes were worded.111
In Leaverton, the divisibility of the statute and use of the modified cate-
gorical approach was good news for the defendant because the particular
section of the statute was too broad in comparison to generic manslaugh-
ter under federal law.112  Therefore, his manslaughter conviction did not
qualify as a crime of violence.113  Consequently, the defendant could not
face mandatory life imprisonment under the VCCA’s three-strikes en-
hancement because the his criminal history did not include the required
predicate crimes needed to trigger the enhancement.114
However, the defendant in Smith landed on the opposite side of the
spectrum.115  Because North Carolina’s voluntary manslaughter statute
was clear, and corresponded with the intent element in the use-of-force
clause of the ACCA, the defendant’s manslaughter conviction did qualify
as a violent felony.116  Thus, he was subjected to the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum due to his conviction’s classification as a violent
crime.117
Oklahoma manslaughter conviction did not amount to violent predicate crime).
But see Smith, 882 F.3d at 464 (holding North Carolina manslaughter conviction
met federal guideline for violent predicate crime).
111. Compare OKLA. STAT. TIT. § 711 (Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute ana-
lyzed in Leaverton) with N.C. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 206.40 (detailing elements for North
Carolina voluntary manslaughter conviction). See also Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1253
(noting defendant’s prior Oklahoma manslaughter conviction); Smith, 882 F.3d at
464 (noting defendant’s North Carolina voluntary manslaughter conviction).  For
a full discussion of why the particular wording or broadness of a statute matters in
the classification of predicate crimes, see supra notes 56–78 and accompanying
text.
112. See Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1257–58 (“[W]e cannot say that a conviction
under § 711(2) ‘necessarily involved facts equating to” generic manslaughter.’”).
113. See id. (holding that the Oklahoma manslaughter statute did not consti-
tute generic manslaughter under VCCA).
114. See id. (stating that conviction under second prong of Oklahoma’s first
degree manslaughter statute did not “involve[ ] . . . facts equating to ‘generic man-
slaughter’” and thus did not qualify as manslaughter as defined in 18 U.S.C.
3559(c)(2)(F)(i)); see also OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21 § 711 (Oklahoma’s first-degree man-
slaughter statute).
115. See Smith, 882 F.3d at 462 (holding that prior North Carolina voluntary
manslaughter conviction did constitute violent felony, and thus sentencing en-
hancement under the ACCA applied).
116. See id. at 464 (“It is beyond dispute that the intentional use of force satis-
fies the mens rea requirement of ACCA’s force clause.  That is exactly what is re-
quired to support conviction for North Carolina voluntary manslaughter.”).
117. For a full discussion of the facts in Smith and  explanation of why the
Smith court held the defendant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction under North
Carolina law as a predicate violent felony for purposes of sentencing under the
ACCA, see supra notes 93–105 and accompanying text.  For a full discussion of why
clear state statutes with an indivisible set of elements do not require analysis under
the modified categorical approach, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, ex-
plaining the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mathis.  As one scholar notes, the “circum-
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In juxtaposing these two cases and how each court determined the
relevant predicate crime classification, the courts focused on how the par-
ticular state statute was worded, and how that statutory language measured
up against its federal generic counterparts.118  It does not intuitively follow
that just because someone is convicted of manslaughter in Oklahoma
rather than under a more specifically-worded statute in North Carolina,
that the manslaughter conviction for what may have been nearly identical
conduct does qualify as a crime of violence in one instance and not an-
other.119  This leaves one question: how do we fix it to avoid these dispa-
rate sentences?120
B. Remanding this Process for Resentencing to Achieve Correct Corrections
Method: Amending the Categorical and Modified Categorical
Approaches and Striving for Consistency Nationwide in
Classifying Predicate Crimes
The current legal landscape of federal sentencing, enhancement, and
crimes of violence has clearly created a problem.121  Jurisprudence in the
area of deciding what does and does not constitute a crime of violence as a
predicate crime has yielded inconsistent results for a variety of criminal
acts.122  Thus, confusion exists on what actually constitutes a predicate vio-
lent felony, and inconsistent enhanced sentences are imposed for offend-
ers who have committed nearly identical predicate crimes.123  The only
stances” that require a sentencing judge to go beyond the convicting statute are
when the statute a defendant is convicted under is “divisible.” See Sharpless, supra
note 57, at 1284–85 (discussing categorical approach versus modified categorical
approach).
118. For a discussion of how the state statute was analyzed in Leaverton, see
supra notes 83–92 and accompanying text.  Conversely, for an analysis of how the
state statute was considered in Smith, see supra notes 93–105 and accompanying
text.
119. For explanation of Oklahoma’s manslaughter statute, OKLA. STAT. TIT.
21 § 711, see supra notes 83–92 and accompanying text explaining its applicability
in Leaverton.  For an explanation of North Carolina’s voluntary manslaughter stat-
ute, see supra notes 93–105 and accompanying text explaining its function in
Smith.
120. For a discussion of potential solutions to the issue of classification of
predicate violent felonies in sentencing matters, see infra notes 121–40 and accom-
panying text.
121. For a discussion of the inconsistencies in results of two federal court
cases addressing predicate crimes of state-level voluntary manslaughter, and the
differing methods that the courts used in analyzing each of the statutes in play in
their respective cases, see supra notes 79–105 and accompanying text discussing
Leaverton and Smith.
122. Compare Leaverton, 895 F.3d at 1257–58 (holding that conviction under
Oklahoma manslaughter statute did not qualify for federal sentencing enhance-
ment), with Smith, 882 F.3d at 462 (holding that North Carolina manslaughter con-
viction qualified for federal sentencing enhancement). See, e.g. Richardson, supra
note 35, at 2031 (noting that categorical approach provides “a threat uniformity”).
123. See Bench, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that Eighth Circuit jurisprudence
after Begay v. United States has resulted in confusion over what constitutes a “violent
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thing differentiating defendants’ predicate crimes is the specific language
of the statute the defendants were convicted under; different states have
different statutes with different elements for what may truly does consti-
tute the same crime—and some are clearer than others.124
While some state statutes are clear and invoke clear application of the
Taylor categorical approach, others require a court to divide up a state
statute, and then compare particular conviction elements against the fed-
eral generic versions of the crime charged to determine if the state statute
is broader or narrower than the federal statute.125  If all states worded
their criminal statutes the same way and all federal courts were interpret-
ing the same statutory language, uniform application would be simple;
however, because each state has different statutory schemes, the uniform
application of federal sentencing guidelines becomes tricky and yields dif-
fering results for very similar crimes.126
Critics have suggested a number of different ways that the crime-of-
violence analysis could be improved to provide greater parallelism for sen-
tencing results across jurisdictions.127  Others have suggested scrapping
crime”); see also Embrey, supra note 13, at 470 (noting circuit splits regarding
whether individual fleeing police officer constitutes violent crime for purposes of
federal sentencing); Stegner, supra note 13, at 184 (noting differences in opinion
as to whether fleeing police qualifies as predicate crime of violence).
124. See Bench, supra note 1, at 214 (explaining that “the use of categorical
and modified categorical approaches to reviewing prior convictions can result in
decisions that, at times, appear absurd depending upon the underlying facts of the
prior convictions”). Bench noted that at other times, the cases applying these ap-
proaches reveal “a logical framework.” See id. (noting that reviewing cases can re-
veal coherent background for applying Begay).
125. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263–64 (2013) (holding that
Taylor’s categorical approach is the base approach to take in analyzing statute for
classification of predicate crime as violent felony, and modified categorical ap-
proach only applies when state statute lists several alternative elements, as opposed
to “single, indivisible set of elements”); see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S.
13, 26 (2005) (noting that in case of alternative elements in individual statute,
modified approach allows bringing in certain information from trial court docu-
ments); Sharpless, supra note 57, at 1284 (noting differences in situations where
categorical approach and modified categorical approach apply); O’Connor, supra
note 14, at 874 (noting that “[c]ourts interpreting the three-strikes law likely will
apply the Taylor categorical approach as developed in the ACCA,” but will look to
the modified categorical approach in the case of “any ambiguities that exist with
respect to what specific elements comprised the prior conviction”).
126. For a discussion of the differing outcomes in two federal sentencings
discussing whether particular state convictions for voluntary manslaughter quali-
fied as predicate crimes in a subsequent sentencing, see supra notes 79–105 and
accompanying text, explaining the facts and reasoning of Leaverton and Smith.
127. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 883–85 (calling for post-conviction hear-
ings for every crime to determine whether particular conviction qualified as crime
of violence); see also Sharpless, supra note 57, at 1284 (noting that “an elements test
ameliorates harsh sentencing”); Levine, supra note 14, at 566–67 (calling for reme-
dies to “deficiencies” produced by predicate crime analysis and Armed Career
Criminal Act).  Levine’s position is that the definition of “violent felony” should be
amended to include concrete language, and additionally, Levine asserts that
crimes more than fifteen years old, juvenile offenses, and prior convictions not
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the categorical approach entirely, suggesting the need to totally revamp
classification of predicate crimes under these statutes.128  In adopting any
of these methods, federal sentencing courts across the country might have
more success in applying uniform sentences to defendants who have com-
mitted essentially the same crimes but were convicted under different state
statutory schemes.129
One suggested method of altering the current analysis of whether a
particular predicate crime would qualify as a violent crime is for the legis-
lators to impose a law asking federal and state sentencing courts to make a
ruling after every felony conviction as to whether the conviction classifies
as a violent felony.130  This would take the onus off of the federal sentenc-
ing court in later felony convictions, as they would not need to apply the
categorical or modified categorical approach at the time of sentencing;
instead, there would be a hearing following every conviction to leave a
clear record of the number of violent felonies a particular defendant has
committed.131  However, courts and other scholars have noted that this
separated by an “intervening arrest” should not qualify as predicate offenses under
the ACCA. See Levine, supra note 14, at 567 (noting that “[m]aking these amend-
ments to the ACCA would not only advance the congressional purpose that moti-
vated its enactment but also would help to promote justice”).
128. See Richardson, supra note 35, at 1994–95 (arguing that categorical ap-
proach should not apply to certain parts of § 924 because of particular fact-specific
inquiries and equating this to the argument made in Johnson v. United States, which
held residual clause of statute as unconstitutionally void for vagueness).  Richard-
son specifically says that the categorical approach should not apply to § 924 and
specifically produces inconsistencies in sentences. See id. at 2031 (concluding that
courts should send facts to the jury to decide whether a certain offense is a crime
of violence”).  Conversely to the method supposed by O’Connor, which would be
to hold post-conviction hearings on whether a particular conviction qualified as a
crime of violence, Richardson notes that this method would be ineffective. See id.
at 2033 (advocating for “avoid[ing] the inefficiency of mini-trials” with respect to
§ 924).
129. See Levine, supra note 14, at 567 (noting that reforming scope of qualify-
ing predicate violent felonies under Armed Career Criminal Act in more concrete
manner “would help to promote justice”).
130. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 884–85 (suggesting that one method of
amending current legal situation with regard to confusion on what truly consti-
tutes crime of violence would be to hold post-conviction hearings in every case to
determine whether crime was violent).
131. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 884 (noting that process of classifying
prior offenses for purposes of current sentencing “could be simplified if whenever
a court convicted a defendant it produced a clear and concise record, taking into
consideration that the conviction may have meaning beyond the instant proceed-
ings”).  O’Connor notes a specific process that courts should take in classifying
crimes:
Congress should direct the sentencing court to make three factual find-
ings related to the underlying conduct of the prior offense (the ‘violence
attributes’).  First, the sentencing court should determine whether the
prior offense involved the use of a dangerous weapon or firearm.  Sec-
ond, the sentencing court should find whether the offense involved the
threatened use of a firearm or dangerous weapon.  Third, the sentencing
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method has the potential to create extra court hearings following
conviction.132
Other critics have suggested other methods for amending current
predicate crime jurisprudence, such as making statutory law more con-
crete on what predicate crimes include to avoid an overbroadness issue.133
These methods suggest that actually specifying certain crimes as violent
under statutory law will provide greater clarity in defining predicate of-
fenses.134  Regardless of how one reforms the approach to categorizing
predicate violent felonies, it is evident that reform is needed.135  Putting
an emphasis on whether a state statute is broad in comparison to its fed-
eral counterparts provides an inconsistency in federal sentencing for of-
fenders who truly have committed the same predicate crime.136  This
approach aids in creating an unjust penal system, in which citizens may
receive lighter sentences than parallel offenders merely because their state
law was broad—not because their actual conduct differed that greatly
from offenders in other states.137  Because of the injustice imposed by the
current predicate crime analysis system, courts should adopt an approach
court should indicate whether the crime resulted in death or serious bod-
ily harm.
See id. at 885.  O’Connor argues that this process would establish a “direct benefit”
in allowing sentencing courts to focus on “attributes of violence” rather than con-
ducting the categorical analysis. See id. at 886 (“[A] direct benefit arises from pro-
viding easy access to a prior offense’s underlying conduct, specifically, enabling a
later sentencing court to determine the existence of any attributes of violence.”).
132. See Richardson, supra note 35, at 2033 (noting that conducting post-con-
viction “mini-trials” in order to classify predicate crimes as a crime of violence
would be inefficient).  Richardson also emphasizes that the court in Taylor specifi-
cally guided against a fact specific analysis in order to avoid “practical inconve-
nience” in considering predicate crimes. See id. at 2004.
133. See Levine, supra note 14, at 567 (calling for more concrete statutory con-
struction of what constitutes violent crime for purposes of ACCA and classifying
predicate offenses).
134. See Levine, supra note 14, at 567 (arguing that under ACCA, burglary of
structure other than dwelling, escape, and felony DUI should also be classified as
violent predicate offenses under the statutory scheme itself).  Levine also argues
for timing amendments in categorizing predicate crimes, specifically that crimes
committed more than fifteen years prior to the current offense not qualify as pred-
icate offenses, in addition to juvenile crimes and crimes “not separated by an inter-
vening arrest . . . [and] contained in the same charging instrument  or resulted in
sentences imposed on the same day should not qualify as separate predicate of-
fenses”. See id. at 540 (explaining three proposals for timing issues).
135. See Bench, supra note 1, at 214 (stating that even within same circuit,
confusion exists regarding predicate violent crime analysis); see also O’Connor,
supra note 14, at 884 (recommending reform for predicate crime sentencing when
classifying violent crimes); Levine, supra note 14, at 567 (noting challenges in pred-
icate crime classification and seeking consistency in labeling certain crimes as
predicate violent crimes for purposes of federal sentencing).
136. See Bench, supra note 1, at 214 (noting that current approaches to classi-
fying predicate crimes sometimes create results that appear to be
counterintuitive).
137. See Levine, supra note 14, at 567 (arguing that reforming scope of qualify-
ing predicate violent felonies under ACCA in more concrete manner “would help
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where felonies are classified by the sentencing or trial court as violent im-
mediately after conviction, specifically based on the underlying facts of the
individual case.138  Brief court hearings following conviction would be a
small inconvenience when a mandatory minimum life sentence is at stake,
and could simply be viewed as a short follow-up to trial proceedings.139
Moreover, it would create a simpler process further down the line when
new convictions are considered, and would eliminate the heavy reliance
on statutory language in determining whether a crime is truly violent.140
IV. HOW WE SHOULD USE THIS SENTENCE TO REHABILITATE: IMPACT OF
INCONGRUOUS SENTENCING ON JUSTICE
Enhancing sentencing is certainly important for the most violent of-
fenders who pose dangerous risks to society because protecting society and
our communities is one of the main purposes of the penal system in the
United States.141  It is in the interest of our communities to keep guns out
of the hands of dangerous felons and to keep repeat violent offenders
from having the chance to commit additional violent crimes; the ACCA
and VCCA have important purposes in deterring behavior by imposing
greater sentences.142  Nevertheless, if sentences are going to be enhanced
under federal law in one jurisdiction, intuitively, those enhanced
sentences should apply uniformly for offenders with the same conduct
across all federal jurisdictions.143  We, as citizens, should hold our judicial
to promote justice,” and suggesting that current jurisprudence in classifying predi-
cate violent felonies is somewhat flawed).
138. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 885 (describing approach where sentenc-
ing court could make findings with respect to convictions).
139. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 886–87 (advocating that classification of
felonies at post-conviction hearing would be beneficial).  O’Connor asserts that
while federal courts have rejected a fact specific approach in light of judicial econ-
omy, the judicial economy concern evaporates when the fact-finding court is
tasked with making the inquiry. See id.
140. See O’Connor, supra note 14, at 887 (emphasizing that requiring courts
to make findings following every individual conviction will help later courts in that
sentencing court will “focus on increased punishment of truly violent criminals”
instead of focusing on “whether the prior offense was actually violent”).
141. See Bagaric, supra note 14, at 348 (noting that one of main purposes of
sentencing and sentencing law is “community protection”).  In addition to noting
community protection as one of the main purposes of sentencing, Bagaric explains
that rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and denunciation are other main
“objectives” of sentencing law. See id. (explaining typical “objectives” of sentencing
law); see also Taifa, supra note 52, at 718 (noting that one of main claims of those
enacting three-strikes legislation was “to protect society from the most dangerous
felons”).  Taifa, like Bagaric, also notes that policies like the three-strikes provision
are also enacted to “deter people from committing crimes.” See Taifa, supra note
52, at 725 (explaining beliefs behind “crime control policies”).
142. For a full discussion of the mandatory minimums imposed for offenders
who have previously committed crimes of violence or violent felonies under the
ACCA or VCCA, see supra notes 39–55 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of inconsistent results reached in different circuits with
respect to state manslaughter charges, see supra notes 79–105 and accompanying
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system accountable and advocate to keep classifications of convictions uni-
form across the nation when potential mandatory life sentences are at risk.
Protecting liberty is one of the key concepts that our Nation is founded
upon and, if liberty is being improperly taken away, we need to do
better.144
text; for summaries of further scholarship discussing whether other crimes qualify
as predicate crimes of violence for the purposes of federal sentencing, both
broadly and in particular circuits, such as eluding police or fleeing, see supra notes
13–14 and accompanying text.
144. For a full discussion on how to keep the judicial system more accounta-
ble, see supra notes 121–140 and accompanying text.
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